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Abstract
This paper surveys the development of marginal
cost theories used in the optimal allocation of scarce
resources, and examines the application of these
theories to current-day electricity capacity markets.
The different approaches in use today to ensure grid
reliability and incentivize new resources are exam-
ined. Market challenges are surveyed, as well as
empirical findings that suggest that current market
approaches do not provide proper incentives. We
conclude that the so-called “missing money” is not
missing because of defects in market designs, or so-
called administrative actions—money to incentivize
investments is missing due to a misapplication of
marginal cost theory.
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1 Introduction
Much of the social history of the West-
ern world over the past three decades has
involved replacing what worked with what
sounded good. – Thomas Sowell
Driven by claims during the last quarter of the 20th
century of anticompetitive behavior by electric utili-
ties, frustrations by consumers having to bear much
of the risk of large electric generation investments,
and a desire by many to create a more economi-
cally efficient market for the electric power industry,
the United States began to deregulate (or “reregu-
late”) certain aspects of the electric power industry.
Starting with the Public Utilities Regulatory Poli-
cies Act (“PURPA”) in 1978 and continuing with
energy policy acts in 1992 and 2005, the U.S. whole-
sale power markets (and in some states, the retail
markets) were opened to more competition. Much
like the deregulation of AT&T in the 1980s, these ac-
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tions were expected to spur innovation and reduce
costs to consumers. And like the experience with
AT&T, opinions on the results of the deregulation
of the electric power industry are mixed.
Wholesale power markets in the U.S. today rep-
resent a patchwork of policies and approaches that
impact, if not outright dictate, how capacity, energy
and related products are bought and sold. While
some aspects of all markets appear to function well,
there continues to be much debate about the efficacy
of some. This is particularly true for the markets de-
signed to ensure that sufficient electric generation is
in place today and being planned and constructed
for future use. These Capacity Markets currently
take many and varied forms across the U.S. Most
markets, but not all, define a minimum resource
requirement that entities directly serving customer
load are required to meet. Some rely on bilateral
markets to meet these requirements. Others have
very structured processes (e.g., auctions) to facili-
tate the purchase and sale of generating capacity.
And while there are many prominent individuals in-
volved in the market-structure debate today who be-
lieve long-term markets will self-optimize if only we
can be patient, this issue is far from settled.
There is little scientific basis to predict that long-
term optimality will emerge from short-term deci-
sion making by generation operators. One challenge
to analysis is that there is no agreement on how to
quantify risk to society or to an individual agent in
the market. Another challenge is the enormous un-
certainty over planning horizons of many decades.
The risk to a generator operator is obvious in to-
day’s technological environment: the lifetime of an
efficient combined-cycle generating station may be a
half century, and its purchase price over one billion
dollars. At the same time, revenue over this period
depends on uncertain energy prices and policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: The evolution of regulation of the electric
power industry is discussed in Section 2 to provide
a backdrop for the state of the markets today. Sec-
tion 3 contains a short history of marginal cost the-
ory and its use in today’s energy and capacity mar-
kets. This theory is based on the notion of efficiency,
whose definition is based on a hypothetical Social
Planner’s Problem.
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Current market structures are surveyed in Sec-
tion 4, with emphasis on the elements of mecha-
nisms used to incentivize investment in generating
resources. It is here where we find potential gaps
between the hoped-for optimal Social Planner’s so-
lution, and the outcomes of markets in a real-world
setting. Some of these shortcomings are discussed
in Section 5, and potential solutions are presented
in Section 6.
2 Evolution of the Power Industry
Today, electricity is so basic to the world economy
that certain electricity indices are used to express a
country’s economic standing (consumption or pro-
duction of electricity per capita) and the standard
of living enjoyed by consumers (per capita electricity
consumption in the domestic sector [16]. As such,
the availability and cost of electricity is fundamen-
tal to the economic wellbeing and prosperity of a
society.
Primarily as a result of competitive market forces,
the electric power industry has evolved significantly
over time. Generating resources have become more
reliable and efficient. High-voltage transmission net-
works, nonexistent at the birth of the industry, are
now extremely reliable and efficient.
Practices and procedures, both for system opera-
tion and for long-term planning, have also improved
greatly and now contribute to the overall value and
efficiency of the industry. While many improve-
ments were realized in the early days through trial
and error, today’s systems benefit from the extensive
use of computers to optimize both short-term opera-
tion and longer-term system expansion. These tools
have been particularly helpful in enhancing short-
and long-term planning techniques and practices.
The regulatory paradigm has also changed sig-
nificantly over the history of the electric power
industry—starting first with regulation by munic-
ipalities through the granting of franchises. This
was followed by the creation of public service com-
missions in each state, and eventually regulation of
wholesale market activities at the federal level. In
general, these changes were made to protect electric-
ity consumers from anti-competitive behavior [16].
In the second half of the 20th century, the indus-
try was again changed to promote more competi-
tion. The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of
1978 for the first time allowed companies other than
regulated utilities to sell electricity in the wholesale
power market (limited to renewable energy and co-
generation resources).
The passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992
marked a significant evolution of the industry. Fol-
lowing development of rules by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), the high-voltage
transmission systems that interconnect the utilities
in the United States began providing open access to
all existing utilities and wholesale generators, and
non-utilities were allowed to own and operate elec-
tric generation for sale into the wholesale market. In
addition, entities called power marketers (at the be-
ginning of the electricity markets, typically affiliates
of utilities and investment banks) could participate
freely in the market by purchasing electricity from
one entity and selling to another.
The re-regulation of the electric power industry
led to regional organizations designated to operate
the high-voltage transmission systems on a state-
wide or multi-state basis, and to implement electric-
ity markets for the purchase and sale of electricity
products. Underlying each of the markets is a par-
ticular mathematical formulation of efficiency, and
surrounding marginal cost analysis is the core of
this philosophy. The following section examines the
foundation for these markets and the problems they
create (see Section 4 for a discussion of these new
markets).
3 Marginal Cost and Efficiency
[E]very tub must stand on its own bottom,
and that therefore the products of every in-
dustry must be sold at prices so high as to
cover not only marginal costs but also all
the fixed costs, including interest on irrevo-
cable and often hypothetical investments...
Hotelling [19, pg. 242].
Short- and long-term optimization of resources in
today’s Organized Markets lean heavily on marginal
cost theory and the concepts of economic efficiency.
A major weakness is their reliance on short-run
marginal costs to provide long-run investment sig-
nals. A review of the research regarding the use
of marginal costs to set the price for factors of pro-
duction reveals that some other means of addressing
the fixed cost of assets is needed; this fact was recog-
nized by commonly cited authors in this field, such
as Coase and Schweppe.
3.1 Marginal Costs
The discussion of the use of marginal cost pric-
ing for public utility projects began with a French
engineer in the 1800s. Jules Dupuit introduced the
concept of marginal utility in an 1844 article con-
cerned with the optimum toll for a bridge [12]. This
theory was further formalized by Alfred Marshall in
1890 when he combined the ideas of supply and de-
mand, marginal utility and costs of production [25].
In 1937, Harold Hotelling presented an update to
2
Page 2576
the work of Dupuit (and used the supply and de-
mand curves of Marshall) to argue, among other
things, that the use of tolls on bridges in New Jersey
was resulting in less-than-optimal use [19]. Hotelling
argued that because the amount of the toll was
above the marginal cost to allow people to use the
bridge (which was essentially $0), it prevented some
from utilizing the bridge that would otherwise ben-
efit from such use (because their marginal value was
above $0, but less than the amount of the toll).
In 1946, R. H. Coase addressed the issues pre-
sented by Hotelling and others and specifically
focused on the “conditions of decreasing costs”
[19, 20]; see also [24, 27]. Coase agreed that the
amount paid for goods and services should equal the
marginal cost to produce or provide the goods and
services. However, he pointed out that whenever
marginal costs are less than average costs, the to-
tal amount paid for a product will fall short of total
costs. The is particularly relevant to the optimiza-
tion of power systems, where average total costs are
well above average marginal costs.
Marginal analysis was first applied to investments
in electric power supply by the Electricite´ de France
(EDF) in the late 1940s and in the 1950s. While
most efforts in the United States were focused on
the theoretical aspects of marginal pricing, EDF
was concerned more with the practical implemen-
tation [30, 38]. This work led EDF to implement
a transmission tariff in 1957 that utilized marginal
cost pricing and incorporated these same concepts
into long-term investments. Marcel Boiteux (during
this time an engineer at EDF and later its Chair-
man), studied the relation between short- and long-
run marginal cost pricing. The solution provided
by Boiteux, et al, was to increase the price beyond
marginal costs. EDF continues to lead in both the
economics and the engineering foundations for long-
term planning and investment [1]. Quantifying risk
aversion and uncertainty is an essential component
of this research.
In the 1970s, work in this area continued by
Baumol and Bradford [3] and Feldstein [13], where
Ramsey-Boiteux pricing1 was used to derive how
prices should be increased above marginal cost in or-
der to meet “social revenue requirements.” In 1971,
Vickrey introduced the concepts of “real-time pric-
ing” for a product, albeit for telephone service pric-
ing [3]. However, it wasn’t until the 1980s when work
by Schweppe, et al, focused specifically on electric-
ity [6]. This work, along with other work done by his
1Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is a policy concerning what price
a monopolist should set, to maximize social welfare, subject
to a constraint on profit.
co-authors [4, 5, 36], led up to the book that many
today point to as the basis for the use of marginal
cost pricing in Organized Markets - Spot Pricing of
Electricity [34].
It is a crucial fact that all of the prior research and
analysis into the use of marginal costs from Dupuit
to Schweppe, et al, are consistent with the idea that
while prices for electricity at marginal cost optimize
the general welfare in the short-run, basing revenues
entirely on short-run marginal costs is not sufficient
to recover fixed costs, and therefore insufficient to
incentivize investment in generation.
3.2 Social Planner’s Problem on Engineering
Timescales
Economic systems are said to be Pareto optimal
if there is no alternative way to “organize the pro-
duction and distribution of goods that makes some
consumer better off without making some other con-
sumer worse off” [26].
From a power supply perspective, a power system
is said to be operating under optimal conditions if
there is no alternative way to lower short-run2 costs
by redispatching or modifying the commitment of
available generating resources. However, over the
long-run a system can be said to be optimal only if
investment decisions are also incorporated into the
analysis. That is, a long-term power supply plan can
be said to realize Pareto optimality only if there is
no other combination of existing and potential re-
sources, along with the optimal commitment and
dispatch once given these resources, over the useful
life of the resources. How can an approach that only
uses short-run marginal costs, and ignores long-term
investment costs, provide for an optimum system?
The primary challenge with incentivizing invest-
ments in today’s electricity markets centers around
the time frame covered by our decisions. Operating
decisions are short term; from a few minutes to a
few years. Investment decisions are long term; from
a few years to several decades. More specifically:
• Decisions on the optimal use of generating re-
sources to serve the expected load 5 minutes
in the future consider only those resources cur-
rently on line and synchronized to the system.
• Decisions on the optimal use of generating re-
sources to serve the expected load 30 minutes
in the future consider those resources currently
on line and synchronized to the system, plus
those that can be brought on line and ramped
up to provide the desired output within that
2“Short-run” in this context refers to the period from the
next five minutes through the next few years (i.e., as limited
by the time it takes to install additional generating resources).
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time frame.
• Decisions on the optimal use of generating re-
sources to serve the expected load 3 days in the
future consider almost all existing and available
resources.
• Decisions on the optimal use of generating re-
sources to serve the expected load 10 years in
the future consider all existing resources, plus
any resources and technologies that can be in-
stalled prior to this time. Also, resource over-
hauls, repowerings and retirements are consid-
ered over these longer time scales.
While there is theory to support the emergence
of efficiency as the result of short-term optimization
by selfish agents in the market, this theory is not
likely to be predictive on the timescales of interest in
this paper. We believe that a long-term invest-
ment scenario that is consistent with Pareto
optimality can be achieved only with a certain
level of long-term planning.
4 Organized Markets in the U.S.
The electricity markets in the U.S. today can be
viewed as falling into one of two paradigms. There
continue to be “bilateral markets” in which buyers
and sellers negotiate the purchase and sale of en-
ergy and capacity directly with each other.3 These
transactions can range in timescale from the next
hour up to several decades, and the characteristics
(e.g., firmness, delivery location and price) can be
different for every transaction. And while under cur-
rent regulations, any entity can participate in these
transactions, it takes a certain set of knowledge and
skills to be effective in this market.
Outside of the bilateral markets, and covering
most of the U.S., Organized Markets have been es-
tablished to provide for the buying and selling of
energy, ancillary services and, in some cases capac-
ity, via a central clearing mechanism. The primary
purpose of these markets is to separate generation
and retail electric service from the natural monopoly
functions of transmission and distribution.
The primary agents in these models are gen-
eration companies that supply the electric power,
and the Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) that are
responsible for providing electric service to re-
tail customers [14]. Examples include investor-
owned electric utilities such as Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric, and not-for-profit community-choice aggrega-
tors (CCAs) such as Marin Clean Energy. The
3Bilateral markets for all capacity and energy products
continue to operate in the southeast and parts of the western
U.S. Most of the country continues to utilize bilateral markets
for capacity—at least for meeting part of the markets’ needs.
term “customer” is reserved for the end-consumer
of electricity—residential, commercial or industrial.
4.1 Marginal Pricing in RTOs
Both Independent System Operators (ISOs) and
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are
organizations formed with the approval of the FERC
to coordinate, control and monitor the use of the
electric transmission system by utilities, generators
and marketers. More specifically, an ISO, as spec-
ified in FERC Order 888, is a non-profit organiza-
tion that is designed to provide non-discriminatory
service to all market participants, and is indepen-
dent of the transmission owners and the customers
who use its system. RTOs, defined in FERC Or-
der 2000,4 also provide non-discriminatory access to
the transmission network, but have some additional
responsibilities dealing with transmission planning
and expansion for the entire region served by the
RTO.
Today there are nine ISOs/RTOs operating in
North America. They manage the systems that
serve two thirds of the customers in the U.S., and
over half the population of Canada. Over time, the
distinction between ISOs and RTOs in the United
States has become insignificant. Both organizations
provide similar transmission services under a single
tariff at a single rate, and they operate energy mar-
kets within their footprints. For brevity, we refer
to either ISOs or RTOs, or collectively Organized
Markets, simply as “RTOs.”
The Locational Marginal Price (LMP) is intended
to be the cost of supplying, at least-cost, the next
increment of electric demand at a specific location
(node) on the electric power network, taking into
account both supply (generation/import) offers and
demand (load/export) bids and the physical aspects
of the transmission system, including transmission
and other operational constraints [37]. By design,
when the lowest-priced electricity can be delivered to
all locations in the market footprint (i.e., there are
no transmission constraints), and ignoring electrical
losses, prices are the same across the entire RTO.
However, when power flowing over the transmission
system reaches limits designed to ensure reliable op-
eration, the lowest-priced energy cannot flow freely
to some locations and more expensive generation is
required to serve the load in the constrained regions.
Under this scenario, LMPs are subsequently higher
in those locations.
A key element of the structure of energy markets
4While the functions of RTOs are similar to those of ISOs,
FERC chose to use a new name in Order 2000 for its desired
form of transmission organizations in the U.S.
4
Page 2578
within all RTOs is that resource owners and LSEs
submit offers to sell and bids to buy hourly blocks
of energy for all 24 hours of the next operating day.
The RTO takes these offers and bids and determines
the least cost, security constrained commitment and
dispatch of resources to serve the LSEs for the next
operating day. Out of this process, day-ahead LMPs
are created from the prices offered and bid by the
participants.
In addition to this day-ahead market is a real-
time market in which LMPs are calculated every
five minutes and represent the price that LSEs will
pay and generators will be paid for the subsequent
five-minute period. Even when subject to transmis-
sion limitations or ramping constraints on genera-
tion, prices in excess of marginal cost, and even neg-
ative prices are consistent with economic efficiency
[11, 39].
4.2 “Administrative Actions”
Many entities involved in the RTOs (RTO staff,
market participants, market monitors, regulators,
and market advisors) believe that an economically
efficient market is one in which the only compensa-
tion paid to a generator is tied to a markets’ short-
term LMP [8, 18]. Whether or not this is true, they
universally recognize that problems with the mar-
kets’ design keep the markets from operating effi-
ciently. They believe these problems include:
1. A lack of direct participation by the customers
within the same timescales as the generators
(e.g., hourly).
2. The use of price caps to limit the maximum
price an LMP can rise to, and thus limit the
potential revenue a generator can receive.
3. The use of “administrative actions ” by system
operators to ensure reliable system operations.
While by design, LMPs are not subject to
manipulation by market participants, in prac-
tice system operators have substantial discre-
tion over LMP results through the ability to
classify units as running in “out-of-merit dis-
patch.”5 When this occurs, these units are ex-
cluded from the LMP calculation which often
results in depressing market prices.6
The missing money problem often cited in capac-
ity market research refers to a class of failures in
organized markets. That is, expected net revenues
from sales of energy and ancillary services are be-
5This indicates that one or more resources being dis-
patched are done so for reasons other than economics.
6Under these circumstances, more expensive generation is
brought on line but not allowed to set the market LMP. Other
generators are then required to reduce output, further lower-
ing the overall market LMP.
lieved to provide inadequate incentives for investors
in new generating capacity (or equivalent demand-
side resources) to invest in sufficient new capacity to
match administrative reliability criteria [22] because
of these market failures. “The fundamental source
of the net revenue gap problem is the failure of spot
energy and operating reserve markets to perform in
practice the way they are supposed to perform in
theory [21].” The consequence is that prices paid to
generators in the energy and ancillary service mar-
kets are substantially below the levels required to
stimulate new entry.
Organized Markets have therefore been useful in
bringing efficiencies to short-term system operations
and dispatch, but, in the opinion of some [9], have
been a failure in what was advertised as a principal
benefit: stimulating suitable new investment where
it is needed, and when it is needed.
4.3 Scarcity Pricing
Scarcity occurs when available generation is in-
sufficient to cover the expected energy and operat-
ing reserves required for reliable operation. Scarcity
Pricing provides for an increase in the LMP during
defined scarcity conditions—such conditions being
tied to the level of reserves (regulating, spinning,
standby, etc.) available to be called upon if needed.
As touted by the supporters of this approach, this
is a means to stimulate a more competitive market
and to better provide incentives for investments in
supply-side and demand-side resources.
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Figure 1: Operating Reserve Demand Curve
Some RTOs have implemented versions of Scarcity
Pricing with the design of pricing mechanisms based
on two concepts from traditional system planning: 1.
the Value of Lost Load (VOLL), in units of $/MWh,
that is intended to represent the cost to the ultimate
electricity consumers when load is interrupted, and
2. Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), defined as the
probability that the entire load cannot be served.
As an example of one Scarcity Pricing design,
ERCOT utilizes an Operating Reserve Demand
Curve (ORDC) which adds a Scarcity Price to the
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LMP during any defined periods of scarcity. Figure
1 illustrates the basic structure of the ORDC used
in the ERCOT market [18].
The primary components of an ORDC include: i)
a price, assumed equal to the VOLL, to be paid to all
resources participating in the real-time market when
operating reserves fall below a set level (assumed
equal to the market’s minimum operating reserve
level); and ii) a price to be paid to all resources
participating in the real-time market as operating
reserves approach the minimum designated level.
Though the ERCOT report is not clear, it is as-
sumed that the market operator would determine a
real-time LOLP that corresponds to the settlement
period in question. The VOLL is assumed to be
applicable to all customer classes, and independent
of time. Research has indicated a significant range
for VOLL in practice, with values depending on the
time of day, day of week, customer class and also on
duration [23, 33]. Consequently, the real-time LOLP
and stationary VOLL are parameters that the mar-
kets are currently not equipped to precisely define
or calculate.
4.4 Incentivizing Investments
The methods used in the RTOs in the United
States to incentivize investment in new generation
fall into three categories:
• Energy-only: An approach wherein revenues
from the energy markets (and ancillary services
markets) are expected to provide sufficient com-
pensation and price signals to optimize resource
investments.
• Energy + Capacity Markets: The above
energy-only pricing approach, plus formal ca-
pacity markets, which together are expected to
provide sufficient compensation and price sig-
nals to optimize resource investments.
• Traditional: Least-cost, long-term resource
planning methods that have been used by util-
ities for decades as “incentives” for investment
decisions. For utilities whose generation invest-
ments are still regulated by state utility com-
missions, this approach involves demonstrating
that a proposed expansion plan is “best” (e.g.,
least cost, or close thereto) of the plans evalu-
ated.
Outside of the RTOs, the Traditional method is
being employed, and with good success. Over the
past 15 years, for example, the largest investor-
owned utility in the state of Florida (Florida Power
& Light, or FPL) has invested in some of the most ef-
ficient and cost-effective combined-cycle facilities in
the country [15].7 And while FPL still operates un-
der a cost-of-service, rate-of-return paradigm, even
with this significant expansion of its generation base,
it has seen very little increase in retail rates over this
same period.
5 Critique of Methods used to Incen-
tivize Resource Investments
The fundamental assumption behind today’s
RTOs is that if competitive market forces are al-
lowed to take place in the daily and hourly energy
and ancillary services markets, the resulting prices
(LMPs) will provide all of the incentives needed
for supply side resources. That is, these markets
alone can optimize the Social Welfare. The theory
supporting this assumption is flawed, and moreover
there is no empirical evidence that short-term mar-
kets will lead to long-term optimality.
5.1 Critique of Energy-Only Market Designs
For the energy-only market theory to work, funda-
mental changes need to occur in the market design.
1. Eliminate Reserve Margin Criteria – In
[11, 39] it is shown that a competitive equilib-
rium will result in optimized reserves from the
perspective of the social planner, and average
prices will equal average marginal costs. This
conclusion is valid even with the introduction
of ramping constraints, and uncertain demand
and supply. However, hiding behind these
mathematical conclusions is this fact: there will
be no long-term equilibrium since the genera-
tion companies will not be able to cover their
fixed costs.
It has been argued that the reserve margin cri-
teria in place in the markets, wherein defined
levels of generating capacity in excess of what
is necessary to serve the forecasted peak load,
must be relaxed, if not eliminated. Without this
change, the markets will rarely be without suf-
ficient installed capacity to serve peak loads.8
2. Provide for Direct Retail Participation –
Retail consumers of electricity must be given
the ability, and have the desire, to participate
directly in the market. It is claimed that they
must in fact respond in real-time to market
price signals (see Borenstein’s survey [7] and
Wolak’s testimony to the California state gov-
ernment [41]). While significant technological
7Since 2002, FPL has added over 15,000 MW of highly
efficient, natural gas-fired generation.
8Current reserve margin requirements in place across most
of the U.S. (12% to 20% of projected annual peak load) en-
sures that generation is available to serve load 99.97% of the
time.
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advances have been made (e.g., with smart me-
ters), it is still difficult to see how price signals
can be of value to customers, or of value to the
grid operator [28, 29]; in particular, price sig-
nals cannot produce high quality balancing re-
serves or ramping services that can be obtained
through distributed control [10].
3. Eliminate Administrative Actions – Ad-
ministrative actions (market price caps and
reliability-based, out-of-merit dispatches of re-
sources) would have to be eliminated.
In the unlikely event that any of these changes
could be made, we would still be challenged by other
issues. Even if regulators go along with the plan, will
customers accept the reliability construct required
to create the price spikes needed to incentivize gen-
eration? Will the trigger prices set by retail cus-
tomers for limiting service, equal or exceed those
required by resources to be adequately incentivized?
Will demand-side solutions crush any price spikes
expected as a result of lower reliability standards?
Like the Scarcity Pricing construct, without
crisis there will be no opportunity!
Because an energy-only structure would likely
operate in a manner similar to that of today’s
Scarcity Pricing approaches, it is worthwhile to
point out some significant short-comings in that
pricing scheme.
1. Scarcity pricing in ERCOT and other markets is
linked directly to conditions related to a lack of
operating reserves9 and not planning reserves.10
Therefore, scarcity conditions occur when gen-
eration or transmission resources become un-
available or limited during the operating condi-
tions. This rarely relates to the total capacity
of resources installed in the market.
2. In the current market approach, Scarcity Pric-
ing is only applied to generation and loads that
deviate from the amount cleared in the day-
ahead market. Therefore, any resources that
submit offers in the day-ahead energy market,
clear this market, exactly generate the amount
during the scarcity event that they cleared in
that market, and which have no surplus capac-
ity beyond what cleared, have no ability to re-
ceive the Scarcity Price for energy. They there-
fore receive none of these incentive revenues.
9Operating reserves represent resource capability above
firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load
forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages
and local area protection.
10Planning reserves represent installed capacity above the
forecasted peak-hour firm system demand for a defined period
in the future.
This is an odd construct given that in most mar-
kets resources are expected, if not required, to
submit offers into the day-ahead market.
3. By design, Scarcity Pricing is tied to one price
(or percent of one price) that is assumed to rep-
resent the value to consumers for reliable ser-
vice. The use of one value for the VOLL, re-
gardless of the time of day, time of year, class
of customer, and duration of outage is incon-
sistent with a reasonable understanding of this
parameter [23].
4. Up until recently, LOLP has been used as an
annual, long-term planning metric. The appli-
cation in ERCOT and other markets to oper-
ating time scales and conditions is misguided.
Therefore, unless the markets develop a mecha-
nism to determine an LOLP-type metric given
the exact operating conditions in place during
the scarcity conditions, there is no foundation
for its use in today’s markets.
5. Finally, the reliance on the energy markets to
provide investment signals is inconsistent with
the fundamental marginal cost theory as de-
veloped by Dupuit, Hotelling, Coase, et al.
Marginal costs cannot be used to incentivize in-
vestments when such costs are lower than aver-
age costs.
5.2 Critique of Capacity Markets
The Capacity Markets in use in PJM, ISO-NE,
NYISO and, to a limited degree in MISO, also suffer
from poor design concepts. These include:
• Short-term market horizon Thirty- to fifty-
year investments cannot be optimized in a mar-
ket that only provides for one- to seven-year
contracts.11 The consequence is that potential
investors demand higher returns on equity due
to the uncertain long-term economics of the ar-
rangements (that is, they shift the cost of these
risks to the consumers), and they will natu-
rally be biased toward resources that have lower
capital costs and higher variable costs (favoring
peaking resources over base load resources) [31,
Pg. 73].
• Transmission Investment Coordination
Current market designs provide no explicit co-
optimization with potential transmission im-
provements, nor much, if any, implicit co-
11“For the prospective investor in an expensive, forty-year
asset, it is next to impossible to estimate the probability that
the competitively priced energy produced by the asset will
produce a sufficient return over its lifetime (compared to ex-
isting or yet-to-be-invented alternatives), or whether the asset
will be rendered obsolete or uncompetitive by new regulation
[35].”
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optimization. Investors look only to existing
and potential transmission topologies to decide
on resource locations and have little to no con-
trol or influence over what the transmission
owners may or may not do in the future.
• Natural Gas Infrastructure Coordination
Like with transmission, the lack of coordination
with natural gas investments can significantly
hamper the market from realizing the ultimate
economically efficient solution.
• Reliance on Historical Energy Prices to
set Capacity Price Caps – The demand
curves developed by each Capacity Market are
based on the Cost of New Entry12 for that mar-
ket, and nets out the expected value of en-
ergy revenues that such a hypothetical resource
would realize in the market. However, these
estimates are based on historical prices (PJM,
for example, uses an average of the past three
years). Because the demand curve covers a pe-
riod three years in the future (for PJM), this
means there is a six-year difference. Such a dif-
ference could mean that future energy market
prices could be significantly higher or lower than
those assumed for the demand curve.
The historical methods used to plan for and op-
timize resource expansion are not without faults.
Projects were sometimes planned and built to serve
load that never materialized. Some projects expe-
rienced significant cost overruns, with these costs
typically passed on to consumers under the cost-of-
service, rate-of-return paradigm.13 Some of these
cost overruns were due to changes in regulations dur-
ing the development and construction of projects,
but some were due to poor management, or worse.
6 Resource Investment Solutions
We believe the solution to the problems identified
with today’s Capacity Markets lie in one or more
hybrid approaches that borrow from the methods
perfected over time by traditional resource planners
and those methods that utilize competitive markets.
These solutions are consistent with the expansion
methods applied to industries with similar average-
to-marginal cost structures like the airline industry,
the automobile industry, and the hotel industry.
Three specific options are summarized below that
implement this proposed construct.
• Laissez Faire – Allow LSEs to secure sufficient
capacity to meet their capacity requirements
12The Cost of New Entry, or CONE, is an estimate of the
cost to build the least-cost resource in each market.
13In August 2017, utilities in South Carolina announced
the abandonment of the construction of two new units at the
Summer Nuclear Station.[32]
(defined as serving their load, plus a level of
reserves prescribed of the RTO) by any means
they deem acceptable, as long as the capacity
acquired meets criteria established by the RTO.
• Long-Term Capacity Markets – Require
each LSE to have a portion of their capacity
requirements (perhaps the majority of their re-
quirements) secured for a longer-term period
(e.g., 20+ years instead of 1 year).14 “More
forward contracting would be a good thing from
both a market power mitigation perspective and
from the perspective of those who believe that
price volatility, price uncertainty, and oppor-
tunism are deterrents to investment [21].”
• RTO as the System Planner – Have the
RTO plan for the entire market footprint, com-
petitively bid for generation to meet require-
ments, and allocate costs to market partici-
pants.
While we believe the above approaches are all su-
perior to those currently adopted in the capacity
markets in the U.S. today,15 it is the last approach
that RTOs should implement. Under this best-of-
both-worlds approach, the most valuable features
of the traditional expansion planning approach16
would be retained, while competition for the devel-
opment, ownership and operation of the resources
as seen in today’s RTO Capacity Markets would be
preserved.
Similar to approaches utilized in CAISO and in
the “non-organized” markets in the Western and
Southeastern U.S., this approach would involve a
process where the following are determined through
a market-wide planning process that is conducted
by the RTO itself:
• Reliability requirements are established and
tracked
• Future load requirements are forecasted
• Planned generation and transmission assets are
identified and incorporated
• Long-term analyses are performed by the RTO
that identify: i) the amount of capacity needed,
ii) the desired location of the capacity consid-
ering existing and potential transmission and
natural gas (or other fuel supply) infrastruc-
ture, and iii) the desired technology of resources
used to provide the capacity (supply or demand
14Forward, multi-year contracting has long been recognized
as a means to mitigate problems experienced in the short-term
energy markets [2, 40].
15SPP is excluded, because it is essentially the Laissez Faire
approach and not a “formal” capacity market per se.
16The planning methods and “best practices” used and per-
fected by utilities over the past century.
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side), with proper assessment of risks associated
with newer technologies.
• Following development and agreement on a plan
for the market, competitive auctions will be
held for suppliers to build the desired resources,
who would bear construction and performance
risks.
• The RTO will contract with the successful bid-
ders for the purchase of capacity and associated
energy under long-term (e.g., 20-year+) agree-
ments.
• LSEs will be allocated17 the cost of capacity
required to reliably serve the market based on
their load-ratio share.
A competitive process would then follow that
would determine who would provide the desired re-
sources and what the final prices for these resources
would be.
As suggested by [35], the reason the proposed ap-
proaches are superior lie in the foundational ques-
tions of energy policy. “How will society manage
risk and uncertainty in energy markets?” “How will
it manage the distribution of external costs and ben-
efits not captured by market prices?” The proposed
approaches will do this.
With the RTO as the overall System Planner, it
can incorporate all the “good” from traditional plan-
ning experience and take advantage of economies of
scale to develop market-wide: (i) load and fuel price
forecasts, (ii) technology assessments, (iii) transmis-
sion and fuel supply infrastructure studies, and (iv)
assessments of political, legal and regulatory frame-
works within which that markets may operate in the
future. And like the energy markets, these can all be
done using best-in-class systems, models and meth-
ods.
Critics of the traditional approach to expansion
of power systems should also be satisfied. While
such plans will be developed by the RTO, construc-
tion and performance risks will be borne by the in-
dependent developers and owners of the resources.
Cost overruns and performance penalties will there-
fore not be directly passed through to eventual cus-
tomers.
7 Conclusions
Because, by design, the Capacity Market solutions
used by four of the RTO markets in the U.S. fail to
incorporate many of the engineering principles used
in long-term resource acquisition, they are unable
17One method is to charge each LSE an amount based on
their “load ratio share” of the market’s total capacity require-
ment. This is similar to how capacity costs are allocated to
LSEs in some RTOs today.
to provide adequate investment signals to existing
and potential resource owners [31]. This includes
the lack of a contract term consistent with the en-
gineering time-scales associated with generation in-
vestments. They also ignore most, if not all, of the
strategic aspects concomitant with long-term plan-
ning (impacts on transmission, fuel supply infras-
tructure, fuel diversity, etc.). The solutions provided
address these shortcomings.
As described by Hayek [17] “planning” is the
“complex of interrelated decisions about the allo-
cation of our available resources.” In this context,
Hayek believed all economic activity can therefore
be viewed as planning. And “in any society in
which many people collaborate, this planning, who-
ever does it, will in some measure have to be based
on knowledge which, in the first instance, is not
given to the planner but to somebody else, which
somehow will have to be conveyed to the planner.”
The key issue is therefore not that planning is
done, but who is to do the planning. So the key
dispute regards whether planning is to be done cen-
trally, by one authority for the whole power supply
system, or is divided among many individuals.
Challenges in the creation of capacity markets has
been the focus of this paper. While short-term en-
ergy and ancillary markets are not perfect, the out-
come is largely as intended: the RTOs took well-
developed engineering methods and approaches used
by electric utilities to optimize power supply sys-
tems in the short-term, and simply applied them to
larger systems. They have also taken advantage of
improvements in enhanced computing power to si-
multaneously optimize energy, reserves and trans-
mission over these larger systems—something not
possible until relatively recently.
However, unlike the energy and ancillary ser-
vices markets, the RTOs ignored most of the long-
developed engineering methods and approaches to
optimizing power system expansion plans that cov-
ered longer time periods. This error adversely im-
pacts the investment incentives for all market par-
ticipants. In essence, and again unlike the energy
markets, the RTOs did not take a well-functioning
system and make it better—they made it worse.
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